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Abstract—A secrecy system with side information at the
decoders is studied in the context of lossy source compression
over a noiseless broadcast channel. The decoders have access
to different side information sequences that are correlated with
the source. The fidelity of the communication to the legitimate
receiver is measured by a distortion metric, as is traditionally
done in the Wyner-Ziv problem. The secrecy performance of
the system is also evaluated under a distortion metric. An
achievable rate-distortion region is derived for the general case
of arbitrarily correlated side information. Exact bounds are
obtained for several special cases in which the side information
satisfies certain constraints. An example is considered in which
the side information sequences come from a binary erasure
channel and a binary symmetric channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wire-tap channel with side information at the decoders
has been previously investigated. It was studied in [1] under
an equivocation constraint at the eavesdropper and a complete
characterization of the rate-distortion-equivocation region
was derived. A related problem with coded side information
was studied in [2]. However, using equivocation as the
description of secrecy does not capture how much distortion
will occur if the eavesdropper is forced to reconstruct the
source. In this work, both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper’s reconstructions of the source are measured
by distortion. Furthermore, the eavesdropper is assumed to
make the best use of her side information along with the
encoded message. This setting can also be interpreted as a
game-theoretic model where the two receivers are playing a
zero-sum game and each one is required to output a sequence
that is closest to the source sequence being transmitted.
This distortion-based notion of secrecy was also used in
[3], [4] and [5] with the presence of secret key sharing
between the encoder and the legitimate receiver. It was shown
in [4] that a secret key with any strictly positive rate can force
the eavesdropper’s reconstruction of the source to be as bad
as if she knows only the source distribution, i.e. the distortion
under perfect secrecy. This result suggests, if instead of a
shared secret key, the decoders have access to different side
information, we should be able to force the eavesdropper’s
reconstruction of the source to be the distortion under perfect
secrecy as long as the legitimate receiver’s side information is
somewhat stronger than the eavesdropper’s side information
with respect to the source. This is indeed the case, which
will be formally stated herein. However, in the more general
case, the legitimate receiver may not have the stronger side
information. Can a positive distortion still be forced upon
the eavesdropper? We will show in this paper that we can
encode the source in favor of the legitimate receiver’s side
information so that the eavesdropper can only make limited
use of the encoded message even with the help of her side
information.
The proof technique used in the achievability in this paper
follows the same line as [6], [7], which relies on the soft-
covering lemmas. This approach differs from the traditional
joint-typicality and random-binning based proofs in that it
requires no effort on bounding the different kinds of error
events, and the results obtained from this approach apply
to both discrete and continuous alphabets, since the soft-
covering lemmas have no restriction on the alphabet size.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
A sequence X1, ..., Xn is denoted by Xn. Limits taken
with respect to “n→∞” are abbreviated as “→n”. Inequal-
ities with lim supn→∞ hn ≤ h and lim infn→∞ hn ≥ h
are abbreviated as hn ≤n h and hn ≥n h, respectively.
When X denotes a random variable, x is used to denote
a realization, X is used to denote the support of that random
variable, and ∆X is used to denote the probability simplex
of distributions with alphabet X . The symbol | · | is used
to denote the cardinality. A Markov relation is denoted by
the symbol −. We use EP , PP , and IP (X ;Y ) to indicate
expectation, probability, and mutual information taken with
respect to a distribution P ; however, when the distribution
is clear from the context, the subscript will be omitted. We
use a bold capital letter P to denote that a distribution P is
random. We use R to denote the set of real numbers and R+
to denote the nonnegative subset.
For a distortion measure d : X × Y 7→ R+, we use
E [d(X,Y )] to measure the distortion of X incurred by
reconstructing it as Y . The maximum distortion is defined
as
dmax = max
(x,y)∈X×Y
d(x, y).
The distortion between two sequences is defined to be the
2per-letter average distortion
d(xn, yn) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
d(xt, yt).
B. Total Variation Distance
The total variation distance between two probability mea-
sures P and Q on the same σ-algebra F of subsets of the
sample space X is defined as
‖P −Q‖TV , sup
A∈F
|P (A)−Q(A)|.
Property 1 (Property 2 [8]). The total variation distance
satisfies the following properties:
(a) Let ε > 0 and let f(x) be a function in a bounded range
with width b ∈ R. Then
‖P −Q‖TV < ε =⇒
∣∣EP [f(X)]− EQ[f(X)]∣∣ < εb.
(1)
(b) Total variation satisfies the triangle inequality. For any
S ∈ ∆X ,
‖P −Q‖TV ≤ ‖P − S‖TV + ‖S −Q‖TV . (2)
(c) Let PXPY |X and QXPY |X be two joint distributions on
∆X×Y . Then
‖PXPY |X −QXPY |X‖TV = ‖PX −QX‖TV . (3)
(d) For any P,Q ∈ ∆X×Y ,
‖PX −QX‖TV ≤ ‖PXY −QXY ‖TV . (4)
C. Soft-covering Lemmas
We now introduce two versions of soft-covering lemma,
which will be used for the achievability proof. The basic soft-
covering lemma has been used to obtain lossy source coding
results [6] and [7]. However, a generalized superposition soft-
covering lemma is required for meeting secrecy constraints.
Lemma 1. (Basic soft-covering, [9]] Given a joint distri-
bution PXY , let C(n) be a random collection of sequences
Y n(m), with m = 1, ..., 2nR, each drawn independently and
i.i.d. according to PY . Denote by PXn the output distribution
induced by selecting an index m uniformly at random and
applying Y n(m) to the memoryless channel specified by
PX|Y . Then if R > I(X ;Y ),
ECn
[
‖PXn −
n∏
t=1
PX‖TV
]
≤ ǫn,
where ǫn →n 0.
Lemma 2. (Generalized superposition soft-covering, [8])
Given a joint distribution PUV XZ , let C(n)U be a random
codebook of 2nR1 sequences in Un, each drawn indepen-
dently according to
∏n
t=1 PU (ut) and indexed by m1 ∈ [1 :
2nR1 ]. For each m1, let C(n)V (m1) be a random codebook of
2nR2 sequences in Vn, each drawn independently according
to
∏n
t=1 PV |U (vi|ui(m1)) and indexed by (m1,m2) ∈ [1 :
2nR2 ]. Let
PM1M2XnZk(m1,m2, x
n, zk)
, 2n(R1+R2)
n∏
t=1
PX|UV (xt|Ut(m1), Vt(m1,m2))
PZ|XUV (zt|xt, ut, vt)
1{t∈[k]}, (5)
and
QM1XnZk(m1, x
n, zk)
, 2−nR1
n∏
t=1
PX|U (xi|Ui(m1))
PZ|XU (zi|xi, Ui(m1))
1{t∈[k]} (6)
If R2 > I(X ;V |U), then there exists α ∈ (0, 1], depending
only on the gap R2−I(X ;V |U), such that if k < ⌊αn⌋, then
EC(n) [‖PM1XnZk −QM1XnZk‖TV ] ≤ e
−γn →n 0 (7)
for some γ > 0.
III. PROBLEM SETUP AND MAIN RESULTS
A. Problem Setup
We want to determine the rate-distortion region for a
secrecy system with an i.i.d. source and two side infor-
mation sequences (Xn, Bn,Wn) distributed according to∏n
t=1 PXBW (xt, bt, wt) satisfying the following constraints:
• Encoder fn : Xn 7→ M (possibly stochastic);
• Legitimate receiver decoder gn : M × Bn 7→ Yn
(possibly stochastic);
• Eavesdropper decoder PZn|MWn ;
• Compression rate: R, i.e. |M| = 2nR.
The system performance is measured according to the fol-
lowing distortion metrics:
• Average distortion for the legitimate receiver:
E[db(X
n, Y n)] ≤n Db
• Minimum average distortion for the eavesdropper:
min
PZn|MWn
E[dw(X
n, Zn)] ≥n Dw
Note that db and dw can be the same or different distortion
measures.
Definition 1. The rate-distortion triple (R,Db, Dw) is
achievable if there exists a sequence of rate R encoders and
decoders (fn, gn) such that
E[db(X
n, Y n)] ≤n Db
and
min
PZn|MWn
E[dw(X
n, Zn)] ≥n Dw.
The above mathematical formulation is illustrated in Fig.1.
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PZn|MWn
Xn M Y n
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Fig. 1: Secrecy system setup with side information at the decoders
For the special case of lossless compression between the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver, we make the following
definition.
Definition 2. A rate-distortion pair (R,Dw) is achievable
if there exists a sequence of encoders and decoders (fn, gn)
such that
lim
n→∞
P [Xn 6= Y n] = 0
and
min
PZn|M,Wn
E[dw(X
n, Zn)] ≥n Dw.
B. Less Noisy and More Capable Side Information
Definition 3. The side information B is strictly less noisy
than the side information W with respect to X if
I(V ;B) > I(V ;W )
for all V such that V −X − (B,W ) and I(V ;B) > 0.
Definition 4. The side information B is strictly more capable
than the side information W with respect to X if
I(X ;B) > I(X ;W ).
C. Main Achievability Result
Theorem 1. A rate-distortion triple (R,Db, Dw) is achiev-
able if
R > I(V ;X |B) (8)
Db ≥ E[db(X,Y )] (9)
Dw ≤ min
z(u,w)
E[dw(X,Z(U,W ))] (10)
I(V ;B|U) > I(V ;W |U) (11)
for some PUV XBW = PXBWPV |XPU|V , where Y =
φ(V,B) for some function φ(·, ·).
The proof of the above theorem is provided in the Section
IV.
Theorem 1 involves two auxiliary variables U and V
that are correlated with the source X in a Markov chain
relationship. The variable V can be understood as the lossy
representation of X that is communicated efficiently using
random binning to the intended receiver, which will be used
with the side information B to estimate X , just as in the
setting without an eavesdropper which was pioneered by
[10]. The purpose of the auxiliary variable U is to provide
secrecy similar to the way secrecy is achieved in [1]. The
side information at the intended receiver must be better than
that of the eavesdropper (as measured by mutual information
with V ) in order to prevent decoding of V . The variable U
(if needed) is given away to all parties as the first layer of a
superposition code in order to generate this condition for V .
D. A Trivial Converse
A tight outer bound is not attained and hence, the optimal-
ity of Theorem 1 is not yet known. A trivial outer bound is
stated as follows for completeness.
Theorem 2. If a rate-distortion triple (R,Db, Dw) is achiev-
able, then
R > I(V ;X |B) (12)
Db ≥ E[db(X,Y )] (13)
Dw ≤ min
z(w)
E[dw(X,Z(W ))] (14)
for some PV XBW = PXBWPV |X , where Y = φ(V,B) for
some function φ(·, ·) and all the quantities are with respect
to PXBW .
Proof: To get (12) and (13), we just need to apply
the Wyner-Ziv converse; and to get (14), observe that the
reconstruction cannot be worse than the symbol-by-symbol
estimation of Xn from Wn without using M .
E. Less Noisy Side Information
Corollary 1. If the legitimate receiver has strictly less noisy
side information than the eavesdropper, the converse of
Theorem 2 is tight.
Proof: To see the achievability, we just need to set the
U in Theorem 1 to be ∅.
Note that the strictly less noisy condition meets the in-
equality in Theorem 1. Corollary 1 covers the case of de-
graded side information at the eavesdropper, i.e. X−B−W ,
except for the corner case where I(X ;W ) = I(X ;B).
F. Lossless Compression
When the legitimate receiver must reconstruct the source
sequence losslessly, we have the following inner bound.
Corollary 2. (R,Dw) is achievable if
R > H(X |B) (15)
Dw ≤ min
z(u,w)
E[dw(X, z(U,W ))] (16)
I(X ;B|U) > I(X ;W |U) (17)
for some PUXBW = PXBWPU|X .
Proof: This is consistent with Theorem 1 by setting V =
X and that the additional proof required for lossless recovery
4follows naturally from the construction of the achievability
scheme for Theorem 1.
Corollary 3. If the legitimate receiver has strictly more capa-
ble side information than the eavesdropper with respect to the
source, then the rate-distortion pair (R,Dw) is achievable if
and only if
R ≥ H(X |B) (18)
Dw ≤ min
z(w)
E[dw(X, z(W ))]. (19)
IV. PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY
We now give the achievability proof of Theorem 1 using
the soft-covering lemmas. We apply the same proof technique
using the likelihood encoder as introduced in [7] with the
modification of using a superposition codebook.
The source is encoded into four messages Mp, M ′p, Ms
and M ′s, where Mp and Ms are transmitted and M ′p and M ′s
are virtual messages that are not physically transmitted, but
will be recovered with small error at the legitimate receiver
with the help of the side information. On the other hand,
Mp and M ′p play the role of public messages, which both
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper will decode;
Ms and M ′s index a codeword that is kept secret from the
eavesdropper, which only the legitimate receiver can make
sense of with its own side information.
Fix a distribution PUV XBW = PUPV |UPX|V PBW |X
satisfying
IP (V ;B|U) > IP (V ;W |U),
EP [db(X,φ(V,B))] ≤ Db,
min
z(u,w)
EP [dw(X,Z(U,W ))] ≥ Dw,
and fix rates Rp, R′p, Rs, R′s such that
Rp +R
′
p > IP (U ;X),
R′p < IP (U ;B),
Rs +R
′
s > IP (X ;V |U),
IP (V ;W |U) < R
′
s < IP (V ;B|U).
The distribution induced by the encoder and decoder is
P(xn, bn, wn,mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s, mˆ
′
p, mˆ
′
s, y
n)
, PXnBnWn(x
n
, b
n
, w
n)PE(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s|x
n)
PD(mˆ
′
p, mˆ
′
s|mp, ms, b
n)PΦ(y
n|mp, mˆ
′
p,ms, mˆ
′
s, b
n),(20)
where PE(mp,m′p,ms,m′s|xn) is the source encoder;
PD(mˆ
′
p, mˆ
′
s|mp,ms, b
n) is the first part of the de-
coder that estimates m′p and m′s as mˆ′p and mˆ′s;
PΦ(y
n|mp, mˆ
′
p,ms, mˆ
′
s, b
n) is the second part of the decoder
that reconstructs the source sequence.
Codebook generation: We independently generate
2n(Rp+R
′
p) sequences in Un according to
∏n
t=1 PU (ut)
and index by (mp,m′p) ∈ [1 : 2nRp ] × [1 : 2nR
′
p ].
We use C(n)U to denote this random codebook. For
each (mp,m′p) ∈ [1 : 2nRp ] × [1 : 2nR
′
p ], we
independently generate 2n(Rs+R′s) sequences in Vn
according to
∏n
t=1 PV |U (vt|ut(mp,m
′
p)) and index by
(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s), (ms,m
′
s) ∈ [1 : 2
nRs ] × [1 : 2nR
′
s ]. We
use C
(n)
V (mp,m
′
p) to denote this random codebook.
Encoder: The encoder PE(mp,m′p,ms,m′s|xn) is a like-
lihood encoder [7] that chooses Mp,M ′p,Ms,M ′s stochasti-
cally according to the following probability:
PE(m|x
n) =
L(m|xn)∑
m¯∈M L(m¯|x
n)
where m = (mp,m′p,ms,m′s), M = [1 : 2nRp ] × [1 :
2nR
′
p ]× [1 : 2nRs ]× [1 : 2nR
′
s ], and
L(m|xn) = PXn|V n(x
n|vn(m)).
Decoder: The decoder has two parts. Let
PD(mˆ
′
p, mˆ
′
s|mp,ms, b
n) be a good channel decoder
with respect to the superposition sub-codebook
{vn(mp, ap,ms, as)}ap,as and the memoryless channel
PB|V . For the second part of the decoder, fix a function
φ(·, ·). Define φn(vn, bn) as the concatenation {φ(vt, bt)}nt=1
and set the decoder PΦ to be the deterministic function
PΦ(y
n|mp, mˆ
′
p,ms, mˆ
′
s, b
n)
, 1{yn = φn(vn(mp, mˆ
′
p,ms, mˆ
′
s), b
n)}.
Analysis: We examine the distortions at the two receivers
one at a time. To analyze the distortion at the legitimate
receiver, we will consider four distributions, the induced
distribution P, two approximating distributions Q(1) and
Q(2), and an auxiliary distribution Q′ that helps with the
analysis. The idea is to show that 1) the system has nice
behavior for distortion under Q(2); and 2) P and Q(2)
are close in total variation (on average over the random
codebook) through Q(1). To analyze the distortion at the
eavesdropper, we will consider the induced distribution P
together with an auxiliary distribution Q˜.
A. Distortion at the Legitimate Receiver
This part of the proof follows the same idea of the achiev-
ability proof for the Wyner-Ziv setting using the likelihood
encoder given in [7]. For clarity, we outline the key steps and
some technical details are referred to [7].
The approximating distributions Q(1) and Q(2) are defined
through an idealized distribution Q of the structure given in
5Fig.2. This idealized distribution Q can be written as
Q(xn, bn, wn,mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s, u
n, vn)
= Q(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s)Q(u
n|mp,m
′
p)Q(v
n|un,ms,m
′
s)
Q(xn, bn, wn|mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s) (21)
=
1
2n(Rp+R
′
p+Rs+R
′
s)
1{un = Un(mp,m
′
p)}
1{vn = V n(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s)}
PXnBnWn|V n(x
n, bn, wn|V n(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s)) (22)
=
1
2n(Rp+R
′
p+Rs+R
′
s)
1{un = Un(mp,m
′
p)}
1{vn = V n(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s)}
n∏
t=1
PX|V (xt|vt)PBW |X(bt, wt|xt), (23)
where (23) follows from the Markov relation V −X−BW .
C
(n)
U
C
(n)
V
PX|V PBW |X
Mp
M ′p
Ms
M ′s
Un
V n Xn B
n,Wn
Fig. 2: Idealized distribution Q via a superposition codebook and
memoryless channels PX|V and PBW |X .
Note that the encoder PE satisfies
PE(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s|x
n) = Q(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s|x
n). (24)
Furthermore, it can be verified with the same technique
used in [7] that the idealized distribution Q satisfies:
EC(n) [Q(x
n, bn, wn, un, vn)]
= PXnBnWnUnV n(x
n, bn, wn, un, vn), (25)
where EC(n) [·] denotes EC(n)
U
[
E
C
(n)
V
[·]
]
.
We now define the distributions Q(1) and Q(2) via the
idealized distribution Q as follows:
Q
(1)(xn, bn, wn, un, vn, mp, m
′
p, ms, m
′
s, mˆ
′
p, mˆ
′
s)
, Q(xn, bn, wn,mp, m
′
p, ms, m
′
s, u
n
, v
n)
PD(mˆ
′
p, mˆ
′
s|mp,ms, b
n)PΦ(y
n|mp, mˆ
′
p,ms, mˆ
′
s) (26)
Q
(2)(xn, bn, wn, un, vn, mp, m
′
p, ms, m
′
s, mˆ
′
p, mˆ
′
s)
, Q(xn, bn, wn,mp, m
′
p, ms, m
′
s, u
n
, v
n)
PD(mˆ
′
p, mˆ
′
s|mp,ms, b
n)PΦ(y
n|mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s).(27)
Notice that the distributions Q(1) and Q(2) differ only in
PΦ. From (25), it can be shown that the distortion under
distribution Q(2) averaged over the random codebook is
given by the following:
EC(n)
[
EQ(2) [db(X
n
, Y
n)]
]
=
∑
xn,vn,bn
EC(n) [Q(x
n
, v
n
, b
n)] db(x
n
, φ
n(vn, bn)) (28)
=
∑
xn,vn,bn
PXnV nBn(x
n
, v
n
, b
n)db(x
n
, φ
n(vn, bn))(29)
= EP [db(X,Y )] . (30)
Define the auxiliary distribution Q′ on a subset of the
variables as
Q
′(mp, m
′
p, x
n) ,
1
2n(Rp+R
′
p)
PXn|Un(x
n|Un(mp,m
′
p)). (31)
Since Rs + R′s > IP (X ;V |U), applying the generalized
superposition soft-covering lemma, we have
EC(n)
[∥∥∥QMpM ′pXn −Q′MpM ′pXn
∥∥∥
TV
]
≤ e−γ2n , ǫ2n. (32)
Also since Rp+R′p > IP (U ;X), applying the basic soft-
covering lemma, we have
EC(n)
[∥∥PXn −Q′Xn∥∥TV ] ≤ e−γ1n , ǫ1n. (33)
Using Property 1(b), (33), and (32), we obtain
EC(n)
[∥∥QXn − PXn∥∥TV ] ≤ ǫ1n + ǫ2n , ǫ3n. (34)
Therefore, by definitions of P and Q(1) and Property 1(c),
we have
EC(n)
[∥∥∥P−Q(1)∥∥∥
TV
]
≤ ǫ3n (35)
where the distributions are taken over
XnBnWnMpM
′
pMsM
′
sMˆ
′
pMˆ
′
sY
n
.
On the one hand, we need to apply the Wyner-Ziv tech-
nique to complete the distortion bound at the legitimate
receiver. Since R′p < IP (U ;B) and R′s < IP (V ;B|U),
the codebooks are randomly generated, and M ′p and M ′s
are uniformly distributed under Q, it is well known that the
maximum likelihood decoder (as well as a variety of other
decoders) will drive the error probability to zero as n goes
to infinity. This can be seen from Fig. 2, by identifying for
fixed Mp and Ms, that M ′p and M ′s are the messages to
be transmitted over the memoryless channel PB|V with the
superposition codebook. Specifically,
EC(n)
[
PQ(1)
[
(Mˆ ′p, Mˆ
′
s) 6= (M
′
p,M
′
s)
]]
≤ δn →n 0. (36)
With Lemma 2 of [7], it can be shown that
EC(n)
[∥∥∥∥Q(1)XnBnWnMpMˆ ′pMsMˆ ′s
−Q
(2)
XnBnWnMpM ′pMsM
′
s
∥∥∥∥
TV
]
≤ EC(n)
[
PQ(1)
[
(Mˆ ′p, Mˆ
′
s) 6= (M
′
p,M
′
s)
]]
(37)
≤ δn. (38)
6Hence, by (30), (35) and (38) and Property 1(a) and (b),
we obtain
EC(n) [EP[db(X
n, Y n)]]
≤ EP [db(X,Y )] + dbmax(ǫ3n + δn) (39)
≤ Db + dbmax(ǫ3n + δn). (40)
This completes the distortion analysis at the legitimate re-
ceiver.
B. Distortion at the Eavesdropper
To evaluate the enforced distortion at the eavesdropper
with the best possible decoder, we will consider two distri-
butions: the system induced distribution P and an auxiliary
distribution Q˜(i) defined as
Q˜
(i)(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s, u
n
, x, w
n)
,
1
2n(Rp+R
′
p+Rs+R
′
s)
1{un = Un(mp,m
′
p)}
n∏
t=1
PW |U (wt|Ut(mp, m
′
p))PX|WU (x|wi, Ui(mp,m
′
p)).(41)
Note that under Q˜(i), we have the markov relation
X − Ui(Mp,M
′
p)Wi −MpM
′
pMsM
′
sW
n. (42)
The auxiliary distribution Q˜(i) has the following property:
ECUn
[
Q˜(i)(un, wn, x)
]
=
n∏
t=1
PU (ut)PW |U (wt|ut)PX|WU (x|wi, ui). (43)
Recall that under distribution Q, for fixed Ms = ms,
Q(mp,m
′
p,m
′
s, w
n
, xi|ms)
=
1
2n(Rp+R
′
p+R
′
s)
PWn|V n(w
n|V n(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s))
PX|WVU (xi|wi, Vi(mp,m
′
p,ms,m
′
s), Ui(mp,m
′
p))(44)
Since R′s > IP (V ;W |U), by applying the generalized
superposition soft-covering lemma, we have for fixed ms,
EC(n)
[∥∥∥Q˜(i)MpM′pWnX −QMpM′pWnXi
∥∥∥
TV
]
≤ e−γ4n , ǫ4n. (45)
Averaging over Ms, we have
EC(n)
[∥∥∥Q˜(i)MpM ′pMsWnX −QMpM ′pMsWnXi
∥∥∥
TV
]
≤ ǫ4n, (46)
and by Property 1(b), (35) and (46),
EC(n)
[∥∥∥Q˜(i)MpM ′pMsWnX −PMpM ′pMsWnXi
∥∥∥
TV
]
≤ ǫ3n + ǫ4n , ǫ5n. (47)
Also note that, since Rp+R′p > 0, we can invoke Lemma
2 by identifying
(R1, R2, U, V,X, Z)← (0, Rp +R
′
p,∅, U,∅, U),
where the left side symbols represents the symbols from
Lemma 2. This gives us
EC(n)
[∥∥∥Q˜(i)ui(Mp,M ′p) − PU
∥∥∥
TV
]
≤ e−γ6n , ǫ6n. (48)
Combining (40), (47) and (48), we get
EC(n)
[ n∑
i=1
∥∥∥PMpM ′pMsWnXi − Q˜(i)MpM ′pMsWnX
∥∥∥
TV
+
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥Q˜(i)ui(Mp,M ′p) − PU
∥∥∥
TV
+ |EP[db(X
n, Y n)]−Db|
]
≤ nǫ5n + nǫ6n + dbmax(ǫ3n + δn) (49)
≤ ne−nmin(γ1,γ2,γ4,γ6) + dbmax(ǫ3n + δn) (50)
, ǫn →n 0. (51)
Therefore, there exists a codebook under which
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥PMpM ′pMsWnXi − Q˜(i)MpM ′pMsWnX
∥∥∥
TV
≤ ǫn, (52)
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥Q˜(i)ui(Mp,M ′p) − PU
∥∥∥
TV
≤ ǫn, (53)
and
EP [db(X
n, Y n)] ≤ Db + ǫn. (54)
Finally, the distortion at the eavesdropper can be lower
bounded by
min
zn(mp,ms,wn)
EP [dw(X
n
, z
n(Mp,Ms,W
n))]
≥ min
zn(mp,m′p,ms,w
n)
EP
[
dw(X
n
, z
n(Mp,M
′
p,Ms,W
n))
](55)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
zi(mp,m
′
p,ms,w
n)
EP
[
dw(Xi, zi(Mp,M
′
p,Ms,W
n))
] (56)
≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
zi(mp,m
′
p,ms,w
n)
EQ˜(i)
[
dw(X, zi(Mp,M
′
p,Ms,W
n))
]
−ǫndwmax (57)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
z(u,w)
EQ˜(i)
[
dw(X, z(ui(Mp,M
′
p),Wi))
]
−ǫndwmax (58)
≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
min
z(u,w)
EP [dw(X, z(U,W ))]− 2ǫndwmax (59)
where (58) uses the markov relation under Q˜(i) given in (42), and
(59) uses
∥∥∥Q˜(i)ui(Mp,M′p) − PU
∥∥∥
TV
≤ ǫn from (53) and the fact
that
Q˜
(i)
WiX|Ui
(wi, x|ui) = PW |U (wi|ui)PX|WU (x|wi, ui)
from (41).
This completes the distortion analysis at the eavesdropper.
V. EXAMPLE
We give an example for lossless compression case with
Hamming distortion measure for the eavesdropper. The Ham-
ming distortion measure is defined as
d(x, y) =
{
0, x = y
1, otherwise.
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Fig. 3: Side information B and W correlated with source X
Let Xn be a sequence of i.i.d. Bern(p) source, and let
Bn and Wn be side information obtained through a binary
erasure channel (BEC) and binary symmetric channel (BSC),
respectively, i.e.
PX(0) = 1− PX(1) = 1− p,
PB|X(e|x) = α,
PW |X(1− x|x) = β.
This is illustrated in Fig. 3. This type of side information
was also considered in [11], but only with Bern(12 ) source.
We consider a generic discrete auxiliary random variable
U that takes values on 1, ..., |U| with PU (i) = ui and
PX|U (0|i) = δi, PX|U (1|i) = 1 − δi. It can be shown
that the distortion Dw takes the following form. By applying
Corollary 2, we can obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3. (R,Dw) is achievable for the BEC-BSC side
information with Hamming distortion dw(·, ·) if
R ≥ αh(p)
Dw ≤ max
{ui,δi}3i=1
3∑
i=1
uimin(δi, 1− δi, β)
s.t. 0 ≤ ui, δi ≤ 1
3∑
i=1
ui = 1
3∑
i=1
uiδi = 1− p
3∑
i=1
ui[(1− α)h(δi)− h(δi ∗ β)] + h(β) ≥ 0
where h(·) denotes the binary entropy function.
We plot the distortion at the eavesdropper as a function of
the source distribution p for fixed α and β in Fig. 4 and Fig.
5, where the outer bounds are calculated from Theorem 2.
In Fig. 4, when the legitimate receiver’s side information is
more capable than the eavesdropper’s side information with
respect to the source, perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper
is achieved; when the eavesdropper’s side information is
more capable than the legitimate receiver, with our encoding
scheme, we achieve a positive distortion at the eavesdropper
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Fig. 4: Distortion at the eavesdropper as a function of source
distribution p with α = 0.4, β = 0.04
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Fig. 5: Distortion at the eavesdropper as a function of source
distribution p with α = 0.4, β = 0.1
with no additional cost on the compression rate to ensure
lossless decoding at the legitimate receiver. It is worth noting
that our scheme encodes the source so that it favors the side
information for the legitimate receiver even if the legitimate
receiver’s side information is less capable, as opposed to the
case where the regular Wyner-Ziv (Slepian-Wolf) encoding
scheme that gives the same compression rate but no distortion
at the eavesdropper.
In Fig. 5, since the legitimate receiver’s side information
is always more capable than the eavesdropper’s side infor-
mation, it is a direct application of Corollary 3 and perfect
secrecy is ensured.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the performance of a secrecy system
with side information at receivers under the rate-distortion
criteria. Our results show that even if the legitimate receiver
has a weaker side information, a positive distortion can be
enforced to the eavesdropper. Although exact bounds have
been obtained for several special cases, the outer bound
for arbitrarily correlated side information is not tight. This
suggests an interesting direction for future work.
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